



Cabinet Office

National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies

2013 edition

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1. Introduction

Purpose

1.1 The *National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies* (NRR) is a reference document for individuals and organisations wishing to be better prepared for emergencies. The NRR has been published since 2008, and provides updated information on the types of civil emergencies people in the UK could face over the next five years.

Using this document

1.2 **This chapter** explains what an emergency is, according to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and how the risks of emergencies are identified and calculated.

1.3 **Chapter 2** provides an overview of the main kinds of civil emergency that could affect people in the UK. This includes graphical representations of how the main risks of emergency compare with one another in terms of their likelihood, and the scale and extent of their consequences.

1.4 **Chapter 3** outlines in more detail the risks of civil emergencies – both hazards and terrorist threats – and how the Government and emergency responders are planning to prepare for and respond to them. For local assessments of how far these and other risks apply in your area, consult your Community Risk Register or, for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, consult the relevant devolved

administration's website.

1.5 For **public, private and voluntary sector organisations and businesses**: familiarise yourself with the risks outlined in Chapter 3 and then read 'Considerations for businesses and organisations' online at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61931/Chapter_3-Considerations_for_business_and_organisations-2010_Edition.pdf

1.6 For **members of the public**: familiarise yourself with the risks outlined in Chapter 3 and your local Community Risk Register, and then read 'Preparing yourself, your family, and your community for emergencies' online at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/61932/Chapter_4-Preparing_yourself_your_family_and_your_community_for_emergency-2010_Edition.pdf which gives advice for individuals, families and communities on how to prepare for emergencies.

What is a civil emergency?

1.7 The Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (the Act) describes a civil emergency as:

- **an event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the United Kingdom** – where serious damage is defined as 'loss of human life; human illness or injury;

homelessness; damage to property; disruption to the supply of money, food, water, energy or fuel; disruption of a system of communication; disruption of facilities for transport; or disruption of services relating to health'

- **an event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the United Kingdom** – where environmental damage is defined as 'contamination of land, water or air with biological, chemical or radioactive matter, or disruption or destruction of plant life or animal life'
- **war, or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the United Kingdom.**

What is a risk of civil emergency?

1.8 Every year the Government carries out a classified assessment of the risks of civil emergencies facing people in the UK – this is the National Risk Assessment (NRA). The NRR is the unclassified, public version of the NRA. In both the NRA and NRR, how serious the risk of an emergency is depends both on the **likelihood** of it happening over the next five years, and on the **consequences** or **impacts** that people will feel if it does. The highest risks are therefore those that are highly likely to happen and have the highest impact if they do.

How are civil emergencies identified?

1.9 Emergencies are inherently hard to predict, so the first stage in assessing the risks of emergencies is to **identify the risks**. This is done by consulting experts in government departments, devolved administrations, and beyond, who between them can identify instances of possible major accidents, natural events (hazards) and malicious attacks (threats) that are reasonably likely to happen, and could cause significant harm and disruption in the UK in the next five years. A '**reasonable worst case**' is chosen which represents a challenging manifestation of the scenario after highly implausible scenarios are excluded.

1.10 In the NRA, this consultation has produced a list of some 80 types of event that would meet the definition of a civil emergency given in the Act. A further 40 or so are placed on a reserve list because, although they have been judged not to meet the definition, the experts consider that they may do so in the future and need therefore to be kept under review.

1.11 The NRA and the NRR therefore cover:

- all kinds of emergency that meet the definition given in the Act (above) but **not** every conceivable instance of an emergency, and not everyday occurrences – such as street crime – that can cause extended misery and damage over a long period of time but are not 'emergencies' within the meaning of the Act

- risks that are likely to happen in the next five years, but **not** risks that are only likely to materialise in the longer term
- risks of emergencies that directly and significantly damage human welfare or the environment somewhere in the UK, but **not** events that happen overseas unless they directly affect the UK.
- Some examples of risks that were considered in the analysis but excluded for not meeting either the likelihood or impact criteria as described above are: i) significant asteroid strikes in a populated area of the UK; ii) significant earthquakes in the UK; and iii) plant disease outbreaks with significant consequences for human welfare. Risks that are considered but excluded are kept under review and are reconsidered for inclusion in the NRR (and NRA) every year, on the basis of the best available evidence.

1.12 The NRR and NRA cover only emergency events and do not include longer-term trends such as technological advances or climate change, even where these trends may contribute to human welfare or the environment. The effect of trends on emergency events is considered every year as part of the assessment of risks. The effect of long lasting disturbances and trends on our national security and human welfare is considered by the classified **National Security Risk Assessment (NSRA)** which informs our National Security Strategy. The 2010 NSRA is summarised in Part Three of the 2010 National Security Strategy (www.gov.uk/

[government/publications/the-national-security-strategy-a-strong-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-national-security-strategy-a-strong-britain-in-an-age-of-uncertainty)). Work is ongoing to better understand these wider national security risks and any changes to our understanding of these risks will be summarised in the next National Security Strategy in 2015.

How is the likelihood of civil emergencies assessed?

- 1.13 The NRA estimates the likelihood of events happening within a broad range (see figures 1 and 2 on page 10). For some risk scenarios, data such as historical analysis and numeric modelling can be used to inform estimates of likelihood (especially for naturally and accidentally occurring hazards). Scientific expertise is also sought to inform the development and review of risks. Where this is possible, a combination of this analysis and expert judgement is used to estimate the approximate likelihood of the event or situation occurring.
- 1.14 The likelihood of terrorist or other malicious attacks is assessed more subjectively. The willingness of individuals or groups to carry out attacks is balanced against an objective assessment of their capability – now and, as far as possible, over the next five years – and the vulnerability of their potential targets.
- 1.15 To demonstrate the different approach to the assessment of likelihood for hazard and threat risks, hazards and threats are shown on two separate risk matrices (see figures

1 and 2 on page 10). The two scales are not directly comparable with one another; for example, a 'high' plausibility threat does not necessarily have a 'greater than 1 in 2' chance of occurring. For the purposes of planning, however, a hazard or threat in the top right quadrant of either matrix would be given the same priority.

How is the impact of civil emergencies assessed?

1.16 The NRA and NRR take account of the definition of an emergency given in the Act in assessing the expected consequences of an emergency as follows:

- the number of **fatalities** that are directly attributable to the emergency
- **illness or injury** over the period following the onset of the emergency
- levels of **social disruption** to people's daily lives. Ten different types of disruption are taken into account, from an inability to gain access to healthcare or schools to interruptions in supplies of essential services such as food, water and fuel, and to the need for evacuation of individuals from an area
- **economic harm** – the effect on the economy overall, rather than the cost of repairs
- the **psychological impact** that emergencies may have, including widespread anxiety, loss of confidence or outrage that communities may experience.

1.17 Each of the dimensions listed above is scored on a scale of 0 to 5. The overall impact, which indicates the relative scale and extent of all the impacts, is the mean of these five scores.

How should the risk assessment be used?

1.18 The NRR provides the basic information needed for planning for emergencies:

- Figures 1 and 2 in Chapter 2 give a broad indication of the relative likelihood, and the relative impact, of each of the main groups of risk in the country as a whole. This is designed to provide a starting point for readers interested in **knowing what the highest risks are**. But the risks will differ in likelihood and impact from place to place within the country, so emergency planners should cross-refer the NRA with information on local risks published in Community Risk Registers by Local Resilience Forums (which can be accessed via www.gov.uk/local-resilience-forums-contact-details).
- Chapter 3 illustrates in more detail the types of emergency that can happen in the country as a whole. These are designed to help readers **identify** and visualise the risks. They give examples of the most serious instances in recent history.
- In the event of an emergency, it is often not the events themselves that people have to deal with, but their **consequences**. Many of these consequences are common

to a number of quite different kinds of emergency. For example, both a large flooding event and a malicious chemical attack would result in a significant number of displaced people.

- Some of the impacts of emergencies may not themselves be so predictable. Chapter 3 identifies not only the direct impacts of common types of emergency, but also the more complex, indirect or knock-on effects.

Local preparations for emergencies

1.19 Most emergencies are best managed by local emergency responders and emergency planners. The Act provides a common framework for their planning, putting a duty on emergency planners and responders to identify and assess the risks of emergencies affecting the area in which they operate, and the Government provides guidance on this based on the NRA. They must also maintain emergency response plans for these risks, and ensure their own business continuity so that they themselves are able to work effectively during emergencies. Many local communities also plan for emergencies and they will want to think about developing their own local risk register as part of their Community Emergency Plan.

National preparations for emergencies

- 1.20 For each of the types of risk in Chapter 3, the lead government department is identified and is responsible for the day-to-day policy oversight and the coordination, support and overall management of the central government response to an emergency. Many of the departments or agencies have websites giving more information on their work to prepare for these risks. For emergencies on a larger scale, the Government has developed:
- the *Government's Concept of Operations*, which sets out the flexible arrangements for coordinating the response to and recovery from emergencies within the UK: www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-central-government-s-concept-of-operations
 - contingency plans for responding to the most concerning risks of emergency identified in the NRA – see Chapter 2
 - a National Resilience Capabilities Programme, which aims to build a range of capabilities for emergencies: www.gov.uk/preparation-and-planning-for-emergencies-the-capabilities-programme
 - a Strategic National Framework on Community Resilience, which explores the role and resilience of individuals and communities before, during and after an emergency: www.gov.uk/resilience-in-society-infrastructure-communities-and-businesses.

1.21 Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland all have their own resilience arrangements but these are broadly consistent with those outlined above. Details on their civil protection arrangements can be found at:

- **Scotland:** www.readyscotland.org
- **Wales:** <http://walesresilience.gov.uk/?lang=en>
- **Northern Ireland:** www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/civil-contingencies.

2. Overview of the main types of civil emergency

2.1 Catastrophes on the scale of the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan are thankfully rare in the UK. Over the past few years, however, we have seen various emergencies of one sort or another that still have a significant impact on our ability to go about our daily lives. Risks are reviewed annually and in 2013 the highest priority risks are unchanged from 2012. The new risk of **severe wildfires** has been added.

The highest priority risks

2.2 The following are considered by the Government to be the highest priority risks of emergency, taking both likelihood and impact into account:

- **Pandemic influenza** – This remains the most significant civil emergency risk. The outbreak of H1N1 influenza in 2009 ('swine flu') did not match the severity of the scenario that we plan for and is not necessarily indicative of future pandemic influenzas; the three influenza pandemics of the 20th century (1918–19, 1957–58 and 1968–69) all had differing levels of severity. The 2009 H1N1 pandemic does not change the risk of another pandemic emerging (such as an H5N1 ('avian flu') pandemic) or mean that the severity of any future pandemics will be the same as the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. (For further details see page 12.)
- **Coastal flooding** – The risk is of an event similar in consequence to the 1953 east coast flooding emergency – which was the last occasion on which a national emergency was formally declared in the UK – caused by a combination of high tides, a major tidal surge and onshore gale force winds. Our assessment is that the likelihood of such severe consequences is lower now due to the investment made in coastal flood defences. However, the number of people living and working in east coast flood risk areas has increased as has the range of critical infrastructure, so the impacts of overtopping and breaching of flood defences would be potentially more serious than in 1953. A less serious storm surge of this nature happened in November 2007 without causing damage on the scale of the 1953 emergency.
- **Catastrophic terrorist attacks** – Although mass impact terrorist events are unlikely, the 9/11 attacks showed us that they cannot be ruled out. The likelihood of terrorists obtaining effective mass impact biological agents or a functioning nuclear device remains low but not negligible; and the impacts are potentially very serious. CONTEST, the Government's counter-terrorism strategy, is prioritising efforts both to stop terrorists gaining access to the expertise and materials they need to deliver attacks of this nature, and to prepare for the consequences should they

nevertheless succeed. (For further details on unconventional attacks see page 48.)

- **Severe effusive (gas-rich) volcanic eruptions abroad** – The 2010 eruption at the Eyjafjallajökull volcano in Iceland showed some of the consequences that a volcanic eruption abroad can have on the UK and its citizens. Following consultation with geological and meteorological experts about the potential risks the UK faces from volcanic eruptions in Iceland or elsewhere, the assessment is that there are two main kinds of risk from volcanic eruptions. The first is an ash-emitting eruption, similar to that in 2010. The second, which is slightly less likely than an ash-emitting eruption but which could have widespread impacts on health, agriculture and transport, is an effusive-style eruption on the scale of the 1783–84 eruption Laki eruption in Iceland. This second type is now one of the highest priority risks in the NRA and the NRR. (For further details see page 19.)

Newly assessed risks

- 2.3 **Severe wildfires** – The term wildfire refers to unplanned and uncontrolled fire(s) in the natural environment. Heath, moorland and forests are particular at risk as grass, gorse and heather found in these habitats are prone to wildfires. The impacts of wildfires will be most significant if they occur close to urban areas. For example, in May 2011 the Swinley Forest fire took hold close to the urban fringe of Bracknell, resulting in road and school closures and affecting businesses. While the impact of wildfires is relatively low compared with other emergencies, the location of severe wildfires could cause damage or disrupt transport and energy infrastructure (for example, roads, airports, pipelines and power lines), commercial property and homes and crops. They also result in air pollution from smoke and fumes and could contaminate water and habitats and pose a health and safety risk.

The NRR risk matrix

- 2.4 **Figures 1 and 2** below represent the key risks in the most recent NRA. **Chapter 3** provides more detail on each of these risks, including information on what the Government and emergency responders are doing to prepare for them.
- 2.5 Where possible, risks are shown individually on the matrix as they appear in the NRA. Due to the classification of some of the information included in the NRA, some risks are grouped into categories (such as 'attacks on crowded places') rather than indicating their exact position in the NRA. Where this is the case, a judgement is made on where best to place that category on the matrix to reflect the position of the risks within that category. These categories are shown in **bold** text in figures 1 and 2 below. Risks not shown in **bold** text in figures 1 and 2 appear exactly as they do in the NRA.
- 2.6 The matrix remains broadly the same as in 2012 but there have been some changes:
- The two risks that covered zoonotic and non-zoonotic animal diseases were combined in the most recent NRA into one risk, **animal diseases**. The rationale was that the responses for both were broadly similar.
 - **Public disorder** has moved one box to the left to reflect work undertaken to improve understanding of the risk following the 2011 riots.

Figure 1: Risks of terrorist and other malicious attacks





Figure 2: Other risks



3. Risk descriptions

Natural hazards

Human diseases

Risk

3.1 Human diseases can take a variety of forms and consequently their impacts can vary considerably in both scale and nature. The main types of human disease that represent new or additional risks to the UK are outlined below. The examples have been chosen to give an impression of the range of possible diseases that would have a significant disruptive effect, but are by no means exhaustive.

Background

Pandemic influenza

3.2 Influenza pandemics are natural phenomena that have occurred over the centuries, including three times in the 20th century and most recently the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. The symptoms caused by an influenza pandemic are similar to those of seasonal influenza but may be significantly more severe. Influenza pandemics arise because of new influenza viruses that are markedly different from recently circulating influenza viruses. This means that few people, if any, have immunity. The rapid spread from person to person which can take place during pandemics can have significant global human health consequences.

In addition to the severe health effects, a pandemic is also likely to cause significant wider social and economic damage and disruption. The H1N1 influenza pandemic in 2009, while relatively mild, reminds us of the ongoing risk.

3.3 The most notable influenza pandemic of the last century occurred in 1918–19 and is often referred to as 'Spanish flu'. It caused serious illness, an estimated 20–40 million deaths worldwide (with peak mortality rates in people aged 20–45) and major disruption. In the UK alone, there were an estimated 228,000 additional deaths. While the pandemics in 1957 and 1968 (often referred to as 'Asian flu' and 'Hong Kong flu' respectively) were much less severe, they also caused significant illness levels – mainly in the young and the elderly – and an estimated 1–4 million deaths worldwide between them. The impact of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic has been assessed in the UK. The pandemic generally caused mild disease although it did cause more severe disease in some cases and there were 1,550 excess deaths.¹

3.4 The consensus view among experts is that there is a high probability of another influenza pandemic occurring, and this probability is unchanged, regardless of the recent H1N1 influenza pandemic. It is impossible to forecast its timing or the nature of its impact. Based on historical

¹ Excess deaths are defined as the increase in deaths in a population above those that are expected or predicted for a given timeframe.

information, scientific evidence and modelling, the following possibilities exist:

- Many millions of people around the world could become infected, causing global disruption and a potential humanitarian crisis. The latest World Health Organization² estimates are that between 2 million and 7.4 million deaths may occur globally.
- In the UK, up to one half of the population may experience the symptoms; potentially hundreds of thousands of deaths may occur. It is likely that there will be widespread social and economic disruption; significant threats to the continuity of essential services; lower production levels; shortages; and distribution difficulties.
- Individual organisations may suffer from the pandemic's impact on staff absenteeism, therefore reducing the services available.

New and emerging infectious diseases

- 3.5 An emerging infectious disease can be defined as a disease that has recently been recognised or a disease for which cases have increased over the last 20 years, in a specific place or among a specific population.
- 3.6 Over the past 25 years, more than 30 new, or newly recognised, infections have been identified around the world. The pattern of known infections can change as the areas where some diseases are constantly present expand beyond traditional limits.

Most of these newly recognised infections are zoonotic, that is they are naturally transmissible, directly or indirectly, between vertebrate animals and humans. By their very nature, zoonotic infections can be more challenging to monitor.

3.7 Although it is unlikely that a new infectious disease will originate in the UK, it is highly probable that one will emerge in another country. Given the ease and speed with which people can travel around the world, a new infection could spread rapidly before it is detected, and be transmitted to the UK. New diseases therefore pose a potential threat to the health of the UK population, and may present social and economic challenges.

3.8 Recent examples of newly emerged infectious diseases are H5N1 ('avian flu') which emerged in South East Asia and has caused several hundred human deaths, and the 2009 H1N1 virus that caused the most recent influenza pandemic. Although the H5N1 virus has not developed the ability to transmit readily from person to person, in contrast, the H1N1 virus clearly has, spreading quickly and widely since its emergence in Mexico in 2009. A very different example is the new haemorrhagic fever-associated Lujo virus, an arenavirus which emerged in Lusaka, Zambia, in September 2008 and caused only a handful of deaths before it was contained. An example of a new disease that was not so easily contained is SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome), which emerged in Asia in November 2002 and posed a global health threat. By the time SARS was

² www.who.int/

contained in July 2003, over 8,000 people had been affected worldwide, of whom over 750 died. The majority of those cases occurred among close family members associated with a severely ill case, and hospital workers who had cared for SARS patients.

3.9 The likelihood of a new disease like SARS spreading to the UK is low, but if an outbreak of an emerging infectious disease occurred in the UK, and containment measures were not put in place swiftly, the impact could be on the scale of the SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada. Toronto had 251 cases of SARS in two waves over a period of several months. For every patient with confirmed SARS, there were, on average, 10 primary contacts of that patient who needed to be fully investigated and placed in isolation because they might also be incubating disease, and a further 100 secondary contacts (of the first case and of the 10 primary contacts) who would also need to be followed up.

3.10 The emergence overseas of a serious infectious disease may result in a proportion of the British nationals who are not normally resident in the UK (approximately 12 million) choosing to return to the UK. Some returning British nationals would not have the means to support themselves and their return would have a short-term but significant impact upon the areas in which they settle.

3.11 Recent experience internationally with the small number of new coronavirus respiratory infections clearly demonstrates the need for maintaining vigilance and the

Government continues to commit resources to this activity. It also assisted preparedness by ensuring the robustness of the national arrangements to detect, investigate and respond to infectious diseases.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

Pandemic influenza

3.12 The lessons we have learned from dealing with pandemics help us to develop and strengthen preparations for the potentially serious impact of any future influenza pandemic. The Government is collaborating actively with international partners on prevention, detection and research, and is taking every practical step to ensure that the UK is prepared to limit the internal spread of a pandemic and to minimise health, economic and social harm as far as possible.

3.13 The Government plans to maintain a stockpile of antivirals sufficient to treat 50% of the population. In line with current scientific advice, both oseltamivir and zanamivir have been stockpiled to ensure that the response can be as flexible and resilient as possible. The level of stocks will be kept under review in light of the scientific evidence.

3.14 Advance Purchase Agreements (APA) for the supply of pandemic-specific vaccine are in place. Although delivery of the first batch of vaccine may not take place until four to six months after the pandemic has started, as it will take time to identify

the strain of influenza responsible and manufacture the appropriate vaccine, the APAs mean that vaccine will be available as soon as it is developed. The Government also holds limited supplies of licensed H5N1 vaccine which might offer some protection against an H5N1 virus.

3.15 On 10 November 2011, the *UK Influenza Pandemic Preparedness Strategy 2011* was published. The Strategy updates and replaces the 2007 National Framework for responding to an influenza pandemic. The Strategy is a UK-wide document and was developed jointly across the four UK administrations, with professional, NHS, social care and public health organisations, and based on lessons learned and advice from clinical, scientific and other experts.

3.16 While the overall approach is not substantially different from the 2007 National Framework, there are a number of key changes, reflecting the lessons learned following the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic and the recommendations of the independent review and other reports. Chief among these are the need to:

- develop better plans for the initial response to a new influenza pandemic, when the focus should be on rapid and accurate assessment of the nature of the influenza virus and its effects, both clinically and in relation to wider public health implications
- put in place plans to ensure a response that is proportionate to meeting the differing demands of pandemic influenza viruses of milder and more severe impact, rather

than just focusing on the 'worst case' planning assumptions

- take greater account of age-specific and other differences in the rate and pattern of spread of the disease across the UK and internationally
- further explore statistical population-based surveillance, such as serology, to measure the severity of a pandemic in its early stages
- take better account of the learning from behavioural scientists about how people are likely to think, feel and behave during an influenza pandemic
- develop better plans for managing the end of an influenza pandemic – the recovery phase and preparation for subsequent seasonal influenza outbreaks.

New and emerging infectious diseases

3.17 The Department of Health has contingency plans in place for dealing with new and emerging infections and its SARS and pandemic influenza contingency plans would provide the basis for dealing with any future outbreaks should the disease re-emerge. These plans build on our generic responses to outbreaks of infectious diseases and the specific lessons learned during the SARS and other outbreaks. The containment of the SARS outbreaks globally reconfirmed that traditional public health and infection control measures can be successful in containing a new infectious disease. Early recognition of a new infection is

crucial and international collaboration and the deployment of surveillance and monitoring systems is key for tackling new and emerging diseases. The remit of Public Health England (PHE),³ Public Health Wales and Health Scotland includes infectious disease surveillance, detection and diagnosis, and the provision of specialist services. PHE has plans in place for dealing with an outbreak of a new or emerging infection, whether arising abroad or in the UK, and would co-ordinate the investigation and management of any such an outbreak, advising government and the NHS Commissioning Board⁴ on the public health risks and the necessary preventative and control measures. PHE collaborates with other international surveillance bodies and undertakes horizon scanning to enable us to respond rapidly to any international health alerts.

- 3.18 Government departments work closely to strengthen plans to manage an influx of British nationals that may result from a number of scenarios. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office's website provides information on pandemic influenza for British nationals living overseas, as well as travel advice by country which includes up-to-date health advice sections.

Further information

For pandemic influenza

www.gov.uk/pandemic-flu

also

Scottish Government

www.scotland.gov.uk/pandemicflu

Northern Ireland Executive

www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/pandemicflu

Health Protection Scotland

www.hps.scot.nhs.uk

Protection Health Agency Northern Ireland

www.publichealth.hscni.net

Public Health Wales

www.wales.nhs.uk/sites3/page.cfm?orgid_457&pid_27686

Welsh Government

http://wales.gov.uk/topics/health/protection/communicabledisease/flu/?jsessionid_7851FA3EF498070EA885F936A353F033?lang_en

European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control

www.ecdc.europa.eu/

European Union

http://europa.eu/index_en.htm

World Health Organization

www.who.int/topics/influenza/en/

³ Public Health England was established on 1 April 2013 as a new executive agency of the Department of Health and brings together health specialists from 70 organisations into one body. www.gov.uk/phe

⁴ NHS England became a non-departmental public body on 1 April 2013 and oversees the planning, delivery and day-to-day operation of the NHS in England.

Flooding

Risk

3.19 The flooding across England in summer 2007 and in Cumbria and Aberdeenshire during November 2009 highlighted the various forms of flooding that the UK faces. It also highlighted the significant and widespread impact on people, businesses, infrastructure and essential services that flooding can cause. The rising temperatures and sea levels associated with climate change are likely to increase the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, and hence the flood risks across the UK. The three main types (or sources) of flooding are from the sea (coastal or tidal), from rivers and streams, and from surface water (caused by excess rainfall before it enters the drainage system). All three forms of flooding could occur during a single storm. A further scenario, such as a major reservoir dam collapse or failure, could bring about rapid flooding and is included in the major industrial accidents section. The term 'inland flooding' is used to describe all forms of flooding other than coastal.

Background

Coastal flooding

- 3.20 Coastal flooding has the potential to have the most widespread impact in a single event.
- 3.21 The last significant event of this type to affect the UK was in January 1953 when

the east coast of England suffered one of the biggest environmental disasters ever to have occurred in this country. Flood defences were breached by a combination of high tides, storm surge and large waves. Coastal towns in Lincolnshire, Norfolk, Suffolk, Essex and Kent were devastated as sea water rushed into the streets. Over 600km² of land were flooded, 307 people killed and 200 industrial facilities were damaged by floodwater. Over 32,000 people were safely evacuated. A month after the flooding, the estimated cost was £40–50 million, the equivalent of around £1 billion today, not including the cost of relocation and interruption of business activity. Since 1953, much work has been done to improve flood defences. Consequently, the likelihood of defences failing or being overtopped by sea tides is now substantially lower. In particular, the construction of the Thames Barrier in London and associated flood defence systems along the east coast of England now means that there is a good level of protection against sea and tidal surges. In Wales, large-scale coastal defence schemes are being processed at a number of locations including Borth in Ceredigion, Colwyn Bay in Conwy, West Rhyl and Denbigh in Denbighshire and Riverside in Newport. These schemes are being taken forward with the support of the European Regional Development Fund and are part of a programme aiming to reduce risk for over 3,000 properties across Wales. However, the improvements in flood defences have led to significant development of homes,

businesses and infrastructure behind them. The consequences of any breach or overtopping of flood defences will now be much greater than previously experienced.

Inland flooding

3.22 The frequency of inland flooding is increasing; this is evidenced by several examples of river and surface water floods over the last few years. Of these, the events of summer 2007 were the most widespread. In June–July 2007, severe rainfall during an extremely wet summer led to the flooding of 48,000 households and 7,300 businesses across England. Other effects of recent flooding have included the closure of primary transport routes, the loss of some critical services such as electricity, telecommunications and water supplies, and large numbers of people requiring evacuation and alternative accommodation. Businesses as well as homes have been made inaccessible for many months while buildings dry out and damage is repaired. The flooding in Cumbria in November 2009 caused six bridges to collapse, severing the road network and cutting off communities.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.23 The Government has a programme of flood risk management, which aims to reduce the likelihood and consequences

of flooding. Local Resilience Forums⁵ are required to have planning in place to assess the risk of flooding and develop appropriate contingency plans. These arrangements are constantly under review. In Scotland, flooding is a devolved matter and there are equivalent measures in place.

3.24 Both the Met Office and the Environment Agency/Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)/Natural Resources Wales,⁶ together with the Flood Forecasting Centre, maintain sophisticated monitoring and forecasting systems for the UK, to anticipate the risk of flooding and to provide early warning information about the areas likely to be impacted. For coastal, inland and ground water flooding in England and Wales, the Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales provide automated flood warnings directly to customers registered on the system. This is called the Floodline Warnings Direct system and is also provided in Scotland by SEPA. The national helpline, Floodline, is available 24/7 for people to obtain information about flood risk and to learn more about what to do before, during and after a flood. Flood warning information provided centrally is complemented in some areas by local authorities through the use of sirens, where available, and door knocking.

⁵ Local Resilience Forums were established under the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and are the principal mechanism for multi-agency cooperation and information sharing at the local level on civil protection planning and preparedness work carried out by Category 1 and Category 2 responders and other organisations.

⁶ The Environment Agency in Wales, Forestry Commission in Wales and the Countryside Council for Wales merged on 1 April 2013 to form Natural Resources Wales.

Further information

Environment Agency flood pages

www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/floods/default.aspx

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) flood pages

www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-the-threats-of-flooding-and-coastal-change#issue

Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)

www.sepa.org.uk

Natural Resources Wales

<http://naturalresourceswales.gov.uk/?lang=en>

Rivers Agency of Northern Ireland

www.dardni.gov.uk/riversagency/

Public Health England

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-england

Northern Ireland Executive

www.dhsspsni.gov.uk/flooding_guidance_3.pdf

Volcanic hazards

Risk

3.25 Volcanic eruptions abroad can have significant consequences in the UK, including disruptions to aviation, and, depending on the volume of gases emitted, significant public health and environmental impacts. This subsequently leads to a number of secondary impacts, including disruption to critical supply chains and economic impacts. There are a range of volcanoes across Europe (such as Santorini in the Aegean Sea and Vesuvius in Italy) whose eruption could have significant consequences in the UK; but volcanoes in Iceland are of most concern because of the active volcanic nature of this region (it has 30 volcanic systems and frequent volcanic eruptions – one eruption every 5 years on average) and the prevailing meteorology.

Background

3.26 The range, scale and intensity of the consequences of volcanic eruptions abroad are influenced by the characteristics and location of the volcanic eruption and weather conditions at the time. In particular it is important to distinguish between explosive and effusive eruption styles (see below). A single eruption may involve both explosive and effusive styles.

Effusive eruption styles which emit mainly volcanic gases

3.27 Effusive volcanic eruption styles generally occur when hot, relatively runny magma reaches the surface of the volcano. Gas bubbles can usually separate easily from runny magma, so significant pressures do not build up and gases escape easily to the atmosphere. Lava flows and smaller magnitude explosions (less than 20km in height) are typically produced. Significant eruptions of this type can emit large volumes of gases and aerosols into the atmosphere over months or years.

3.28 The Laki eruption from Grimsvötn volcano in Iceland is the best understood large magnitude eruption of this type on which we have data. In 1783–84 Grimsvötn erupted along a 27km-long fissure system (Laki). Analysis of the geological and historical data about this eruption indicates that significant levels of sulphur dioxide, chlorine and fluorine were released over a number of months, causing visible pollution across the UK and Northern Europe which is thought to have resulted in mass crop failure and thousands of excess deaths. (At least 20% of the population of Iceland succumbed to famine and disease.) Records suggest that mortality in England in the summer of 1783 was 10–20% above average and there are similar historical accounts of increased mortality rates and/or respiratory disorders in France, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden.⁷

3.29 The research and ongoing modelling have been used to estimate the expected modern-day impacts of a similar event. It is anticipated that an eruption of this scale and type could have significant public health impacts on the ground. Similarly, the aviation industry and aircraft passengers could be affected because at this height sulphur dioxide concentrations could be even greater than at the ground. However, a quantitative assessment is required to fully characterise the risks. Widespread airspace closures on a significantly bigger and more prolonged scale than those experienced in April 2010 could be expected due to the longevity of such an eruption.

3.30 Higher than expected sulphur dioxide concentrations, sulphate aerosol concentrations and deposits of other chemicals emitted during such an eruption could also have significant environmental impacts, especially for sensitive environments.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.31 The International Civil Aviation Organization has an established International Airways Volcano Watch consisting of nine Volcanic Ash Advisory Centres (VAACs) located around the world, each of which has the responsibility for coordinating and disseminating information on volcanic ash that might endanger aircraft. The London VAAC, run by the Met Office, has responsibility for monitoring

⁷ Excess deaths are defined as the increase in deaths in a population above those that are expected or predicted for a given timeframe.

Iceland, the UK and the north-east area of the North Atlantic.

- 3.32 Under the auspices of the World Meteorological Organization, the Met Office is also one of eight global Regionally Specialised Meteorological Centres for modelling the dispersal of particles (including ash) in the atmosphere. Such models allow evidence-based judgements to be made to determine whether it is safe to fly and whether passenger safety can be protected.
- 3.33 Following the volcanic ash disruptions in 2010, significant work has been undertaken to better monitor volcanic hazards and understand the impacts that explosive and effusive eruptions would have. This includes building stronger relations with relevant international organisations and the establishment of networks of experts on volcanic hazards more widely. Work continues within central government to better understand and plan – in a proportionate way – for the expected impacts of both types of eruption.

Further information

Iceland Met Office

<http://en.vedur.is/>

British Geological Survey

<http://bgs.ac.uk/>

Global Volcanism Program

www.volcano.si.edu/index.cfm

International Volcanic Health Hazard Network

www.ivhnh.org/

Severe space weather

Risk

- 3.34 Weather on Earth, such as wind, snow and rain, has different terrestrial impacts and different meteorological causes. Similarly, space weather, including geomagnetic storms, radiation storms and solar radio noise, has different terrestrial impacts and is the result of different types of solar phenomena, including coronal mass ejections (CMEs), solar energetic particle events, solar flares and solar radio bursts. Current understanding is that a severe space weather event could have impacts upon a range of technologies and infrastructure, including power networks, satellite services, transport and digital control components.

Background

- 3.35 Solar activity is cyclical, waxing and waning with an average period of approximately 11 years. The last maxima occurred in 2000 while the next is forecast to occur around May 2013.
- 3.36 The Carrington Event in 1859 is described as the perfect storm because the largest CMEs, radiation storms and solar flares ever recorded happened during this period.
- 3.37 Other significant space weather events have been recorded since then. A space weather storm in 1989 had considerable impacts on terrestrial infrastructure, most notably tripping the equipment protection systems of the Hydro-Québec electricity network, resulting in loss of power for

nine hours across the Canadian province. A solar storm in 2003 interrupted the operation of satellites and caused the GPS augmentation system used by the aviation sector to go offline for approximately a day. Records from solar storms in 1921 and 1960 describe widespread radio disruption and impacts upon railway signalling and switching systems.

- 3.38 While storm impacts in the mid-to-late 20th century have been relatively moderate, dependency upon technology vulnerable to space weather has pervaded most aspects of modern life and therefore the disruptive consequences of a severe solar storm could be significant.

Power networks

- 3.39 Severe geomagnetic storms caused by fast-moving CMEs can generate large geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) through long conducting electrical systems such as power grids, pipelines and signalling circuits. High levels of GICs can damage transmission, distribution and generation equipment in electricity networks, potentially leading to power failure.

Satellite services

- 3.40 Severe space weather can interrupt satellite services including Global Navigation Satellite Systems, communications, and Earth observation and imaging systems by damaging the space-based hardware, distorting the satellite signal or increasing the errors in ground-based receivers.

Aviation

- 3.41 Airlines rely on high-frequency radio and satellites to maintain communications, both of which can be disrupted by space weather. Cosmic rays and energetic particles from solar radiation storms can adversely affect electronic control components in aircraft.

Digital control systems

- 3.42 High levels of energetic particles produced in the atmosphere by solar radiation storms can greatly enhance error rates in ground digital components found in all modern technology.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

- 3.43 Government has worked together with space weather scientists and engineers as well as industry and asset owners from the communications, transport and energy sectors to assess the risk of a severe space weather event of a similar scale to the Carrington Event of 1859.
- 3.44 However, space weather science is a relatively young field and its impacts upon modern society have only recently come in to the fore as our dependence on technologies vulnerable to solar phenomena increases. Therefore, significant work is continuing to better understand and plan – in a proportionate way – for the expected impacts of a severe space weather event. In particular, the Department of Energy and Climate

Change, National Grid and others in the energy sector are working closely to clarify the potential impacts of a severe event on electricity assets and networks.

3.45 Where relevant, the lead government department for each of the nine critical infrastructure sectors is considering the resilience of its sector to space weather as part of its annual sector resilience plan. These plans are coordinated by the Cabinet Office and aim to set out the Government's understanding of the resilience of infrastructure to natural hazards. A public summary of these plans was published in spring 2011.⁸ The Royal Academy of Engineering's *Extreme Space Weather* report brought together scientific and engineering experts to identify, analyse and critically assess the impacts to the UK's engineering infrastructure.⁹ The report's conclusions and recommendations are now being drawn on by Government to progressively mitigate the impacts of a solar superstorm.

Further information

Rutherford Appleton Laboratory

www.stfc.ac.uk/RALSpace/default.aspx

British Geological Survey

www.bgs.ac.uk/

British Antarctic Survey

www.bas.ac.uk/

Met Office

www.metoffice.gov.uk/research/areas/data/assimilation_and_ensembles/space_weather

Severe weather

Risk

3.46 As experience has shown, severe weather can take a variety of forms and at times can cause significant problems and disruption to normal life. Over the coming years we are likely to see rising temperatures and sea levels and an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events in the UK. There are many types of severe weather, such as dense fog, that can have a serious local impact in a specific area and some of these are outlined in Community Risk Registers (which can be accessed via www.gov.uk/local-resilience-forums-contact-details). However, since they do not have a national impact, they are not covered here. The main types of severe weather that we need to plan for at national level include storms and gales, low temperatures and heavy snow, heatwaves and drought.

⁸ www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/infrastructure-resilience

⁹ www.raeng.org.uk/news/publications/list/reports/space_weather_full_report_final.pdf

Background

Storms and gales

3.47 The most significant storms in recent decades were those of 16 October 1987 and 25 January 1990. The first brought down an estimated 15 million trees in the south-east of England. As the peak wind speeds occurred overnight, there were fewer deaths and injuries than there might have been, given that the storm crossed such a densely populated area.

3.48 By contrast, the 1990 storm which occurred during the daytime was more extensive and had higher peak wind speeds. The more northerly track meant that the storm crossed areas that were on the whole less wooded than those affected by the 1987 storm. The net effect was a much higher death toll but less damage to trees and property.

3.49 More recently, on 18 January 2007, a storm battered many parts of the UK, with gusts of wind up to 77mph recorded at Heathrow. This caused nine deaths and widespread damage to trees and buildings across the UK, along with power disruption.

Low temperatures and heavy snow

3.50 There have been a number of recorded occasions of snow covering large areas of the country for over a week.

3.51 The winter of 2009–10 saw a prolonged spell of cold weather that lasted for approximately a month between mid-December and mid-January. During this

time snow fell widely and sometimes heavily across the UK, with notable falls of up to 40cm recorded in parts of north-west England and south and east Scotland. Many other areas experienced snow cover of 10cm or more throughout this period.

3.52 In Northern Ireland in February 2001 strong north-easterly winds and heavy snow caused travel disruption for up to five days and brought down power lines (resulting in power cuts to 70,000 homes), mostly in Counties Antrim and Down.

3.53 Earlier, more severe events include periods of snow in 1947 and also in 1962–63, which was the coldest winter in over 250 years. As the climate continues to change, the frequency of more extreme weather events is likely to increase, though winters are expected to become milder and wetter on average. Extreme snowfall events may become less frequent in the south of the UK in the future.

Heatwaves

3.54 Temperatures of 32°C or more (the threshold used by the Met Office to define a heatwave) were widespread during August 1990, having been recorded in virtually all parts of England and some parts of Wales. The years 1976 and 1911 were the only other occasions on which half or more of England experienced 32°C. In terms of persistence, 1976 ranks the highest with 32°C being exceeded at one or more places in the UK on 15 consecutive days from 23 June to 7 July.

3.55 The hot summer of 2003 is estimated to have resulted in 2,045 excess deaths (that is, deaths that occur above what is expected for that time of year), mainly among vulnerable populations.¹⁰ Since then, the Heat-Health Watch system¹¹ has been introduced, and during the hot weather of July 2006 significantly fewer (680) excess deaths were recorded. The Department of Health's *Heatwave Plan for England*¹² sets out specific advice for NHS and local authorities and the public.

3.56 Consequences of heatwaves can include:

- an increased number of admissions to hospital and consultations with GPs, due to sunburn, heat exhaustion, respiratory problems and other illnesses such as food poisoning. This excess demand on the health service may cause the cancellation of elective surgery and routine procedures
- more vehicle breakdowns, due to overheating engines
- disruption to travel and logistics, due to deterioration of the road and runway surfaces.

Drought

3.57 Droughts are regular events and vary in intensity and duration across the country. A drought does not arrive without warning. Routine monitoring of drought indicators such as river or groundwater

sites by the Environment Agency in England, Natural Resources Wales, the Northern Ireland Environment Agency and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency picks up indications of any significant deficits developing.

3.58 Periodic restrictions on non-essential water use are an integral part of water resource planning by water companies. During the 2010–12 drought, despite some of parts of south-east and eastern England recording their lowest 18-month rainfall (for the period ending March 2012) in at least 100 years,¹³ its impact extended only as far as the inconvenience for domestic customers of a temporary ban on the use of hosepipes.

3.59 Climate change may produce more droughts but not necessarily a more frequent use of restrictions. Water resource and drought planning must be dynamic to meet the challenges.

3.60 The Environment Agency in England and Natural Resources Wales provide an example of the work done in the UK to monitor, report and act to reduce the impact of drought on the environment. They have drought plans for all of England and Wales setting out how they will manage water resources during a drought. These plans aim to balance the competing interests of the environment and the need for public water supply. They contain a range of environmental indicators that determine the actions to be taken to achieve this aim. Actions

¹⁰Excess deaths are defined as the increase in deaths in a population above those that are expected or predicted for a given timeframe.

¹¹ www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/uk/heathealth/

¹² www.dh.gov.uk/en/Publicationsandstatistics/Publications/PublicationsPolicyAndGuidance/DH_134152

¹³ www.ceh.ac.uk/data/nrfa/nhmp/other_reports/2012_Drought_Transformation.pdf

to manage drought include increased environmental monitoring, liaising with water companies, public awareness campaigns and assessments of drought permits and orders.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.61 The Met Office has responsibility for providing weather warnings for the UK. Advisory messages are issued routinely on the Met Office website, using a traffic-light system that indicates how confident we can be that severe or extreme weather is due.

3.62 Early warnings of severe or extreme weather are issued when the Met Office has 60% or greater confidence that severe weather is expected in the next few days. Flash warnings of severe or extreme weather are issued when the Met Office has 80% or greater confidence that severe weather is expected in the next few hours.

3.63 The Heat-Health Watch system operates in England and Wales between 1 June and 15 September each year in association with the Department of Health and the Welsh Government. The system comprises four levels of response, based on threshold maximum daytime and minimum night-time temperatures. These thresholds vary by region, but an average threshold temperature is 30°C by day and 15°C overnight.

3.64 Water companies' statutory drought plans have trigger points to initiate a range of actions during the various stages of a drought to manage supplies and demand. Emergency Drought Orders (EDOs) can authorise supply interruptions through standpipes or rota cuts. EDO powers have only been exercised three times in England and Wales since 1945 and not since 1976 when they were used in north Devon and south-east Wales.

Further information

Met Office website for up to date weather warnings

www.metoffice.gov.uk

Advice on what to do when severe weather is forecast

www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/uk/advice/index.html

Heat Health Watch

www.metoffice.gov.uk/weather/uk/heathealth/

Public Health England

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-england

Information on water restrictions and what to do in a drought

www.environment-agency.gov.uk/homeandleisure/drought/

Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs

www.gov.uk/government/policies/maintaining-secure-water-supplies-high-standards-of-drinking-water-and-effective-sewerage-services/supporting-pages/water-resource-management

Scottish Government

www.readyscotland.org/are-you-ready/winter-weather

Scottish Environment Protection Agency

www.sepa.org.uk

Welsh Government Winter Weather

<http://wales.gov.uk/topics/housingandcommunity/safety/walesresilience/winterweather/?jsessionid=9150F2B014E2FE474104AA4803736F56?lang=en>

Northern Ireland Executive

www.doeni.gov.uk/index/protect_the_environment/water.htm

Severe wildfires

Risk

- 3.65 Risks are reviewed annually and the risk posed by wildfires, as detailed below, is a new inclusion to the National Risk Assessment and National Risk Register.
- 3.66 Wildfires are predominantly started as a result of human activity. This could be accidental, through carelessness (for example as a result of barbecues or camp fires), or deliberate. Sparks from power lines and transport, or ordnance in military training areas have also been known to start wildfires. Natural phenomena (for example, lightning) also account for a proportion of wildfires.
- 3.67 Some weather conditions (for example, hot, dry and/or windy) provide good conditions for wildfires to start and/or spread. These weather conditions tend to be relatively short-lived and not spread evenly across the year. The UK nominally has two fire seasons: spring (March to May); and summer (July to September). In years where there has been a significant drought, the number of wildfires usually

rises significantly. Climate change is likely to lead to longer drier summers, thus increasing the risk of more frequent, larger fires.

- 3.68 The risk of wildfires is also affected by the availability and dryness of fuel for the fire to burn (for example, vegetation). Increased or significant rainfall which causes vegetation to grow excessively can, when the vegetation is dry, increase the risk. Once a fire has taken hold it can be very difficult to extinguish unless there is heavy rain.

Harm to people

- 3.69 Casualties from wildfire tend to be low, but there could be significant distress and possible public health consequences, such as an increase in respiratory ailments due to smoke or fumes.

Disruption and damage to infrastructure and services

- 3.70 Wildfires may disrupt many aspects of day-to-day life, for instance roads and schools could close and people may need to be evacuated from affected urban areas.
- 3.71 Disruption to electricity, fuel supplies and telecommunications are also possible if the fire reaches electricity sub-stations, fuel pumping stations, or telecommunications masts, which are often located at urban–rural boundaries.

- 3.72 There is also a possibility of water contamination as ash and other burn particulates dissolve into groundwater and reservoir supplies.

- 3.73 Wildfires present a challenge for the emergency services in dealing with the incident while maintaining ‘business as usual’ to manage other emergency response events.

Economic

- 3.74 Disruptions to services (as above) and businesses result in economic costs. Response, clean up and recovery (including restorative costs) add to the economic cost of a severe wildfire.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

- 3.75 The Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is responsible for supporting local fire and rescue authorities in England so that they are able to respond to emergencies and reduce the number and impact of fires. Given this, DCLG is the ‘risk owner’ in terms of severe wildfire, and indeed the relevant Fire and Rescue Service would attend to any such fire to put it out.
- 3.76 There is a distinction between DCLG being the risk owner and a government department taking lead responsibility for a severe wildfire. Depending on the circumstances of any severe wildfire, the most significantly impacted government department would be most

likely to take the lead responsibility. However, the impact (apart from putting the fire out) would probably fall on several government departments and agencies. Although DCLG is the risk owner, this does not affect the devolved administrations' responsibilities for the Fire and Rescue Service.

- 3.77 DCLG continues to work closely with both the Fire and Rescue Service and Local Resilience Forums in England (operating on a multi-agency basis to plan and prepare for localised incidents and wider large-scale emergencies) to consider the severe wildfire risk in a local context.

Further information

DCLG fire statistics

www.gov.uk/government/publications/fire-statistics-great-britain-2011-to-2012

Climate change risk assessment

www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climate/government/risk-assessment/

Welsh Fire Statistics

http://wales.gov.uk/topics/statistics/headlines/fire2012/?lang_en

Animal diseases

Risk

- 3.78 There have been a number of significant outbreaks of exotic notifiable diseases of animals in the UK in recent years with foot and mouth disease (2007) and avian influenza ('bird flu') (last case in 2008) being the most notable examples. When considering the likelihood of such outbreaks, scale should be taken into account. Although the potential exists for very large national outbreaks, as represented in the matrix (figure 2), the most likely disease incursion is a small-to-medium-sized outbreak.

Background

Non-zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (e.g. foot and mouth disease)

- 3.79 Non-zoonotic diseases are those that are not generally considered to be transmitted to humans. Swift action is still needed, however, in order to contain the spread of certain listed or notifiable diseases. As well as foot and mouth disease, other examples are classical swine fever, bluetongue and equine infectious anaemia, of which there were two cases in 2012.

- 3.80 **Foot and mouth disease** is spread very rapidly through both direct and indirect contact and can be windborne. The Government's policy is to contain disease where it is detected through humane culling of susceptible animals on infected premises and contacts where risk of exposure is very high. In addition, strict

controls on movements of susceptible animals and biosecurity are applied. Vaccination is considered from the outset of any foot and mouth disease outbreak but, even if implemented, does not replace a culling policy. Measures for reducing the risk of introduction include effective control on imports of meat, other animal products and susceptible animals.

- 3.81 There are two main forms of swine fever: **classical swine fever**, which has been recorded in the UK, and **African swine fever**, which has not. Although caused by different viruses, both are very contagious diseases of pigs and the measures for control and restriction are similar to those for foot and mouth disease.
- 3.82 **Bluetongue** was recorded in the UK for the first time in 2007. The disease is spread between susceptible animals by infected midges. Sheep are most severely affected by the disease. Measures to reduce the risk of introduction include controls on imports of cattle and sheep. Following a vaccination campaign, the UK is now free of this disease.

Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases (e.g. highly pathogenic avian influenza)

- 3.83 Zoonotic notifiable animal diseases are those diseases that can be transmitted naturally between vertebrate animals and humans. They are named in section 88 of the Animal Health Act 1981 or in an order made under that Act. The ease with which zoonotic disease transmission occurs varies by disease: for highly pathogenic avian influenza, for example, it is relatively uncommon. Only close contact with birds infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza is likely to allow transmission of this disease to humans.
- 3.84 **Highly pathogenic avian influenza** has been recorded in poultry in the UK several times in the last 10 years, most recently in 2008. Migratory wild birds can spread and introduce it by direct and indirect contact with poultry. It can also be introduced by mechanical transmission of infected material. For disease in poultry and captive birds, the control measures include culling birds on the infected premises. There is no policy to cull wild birds. Vaccination has not been used as a control option for practical reasons and given the success of other means of eradicating the disease.
- 3.85 **West Nile virus** is a viral infection mainly of birds, horses and humans, which is spread by the bite of infected mosquitoes. It can cause encephalitis (inflammation of the brain) or meningitis (inflammation of the lining of the brain and spinal cord). Infection by West Nile virus has never been identified in horses or humans in the UK. The virus historically occurs in Africa, mainland Europe, the Middle East, West and Central Asia and in the USA for the first time in 1999, where it is now considered endemic.
- 3.86 **Rabies** is a fatal viral disease of the nervous system which can affect all mammals, including humans. The disease is usually spread by saliva from the bite of an infected animal. Classical rabies has long been eradicated from the UK. Controls on the import of susceptible animals,

including the pet travel scheme, help to protect against infected animals entering the UK. A different type of rabies virus is present at a very low level in some UK bat populations. The risk of a human case of rabies in the UK is very low, given the low prevalence and lack of contact between the majority of the public and bats.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.87 The UK Government works to provide effective guidance to prevent an outbreak of animal disease occurring in the first place, but it also tries to predict local and global trends in order to prepare effectively. This includes:

- monitoring disease outbreaks around the world, and reporting on the latest developments and changes in risks
- working with private veterinary surgeons, industry stakeholders, animal keepers and operational partners at national and local level to provide warnings and rapid detection of UK disease threats, as well as advice and guidance through a range of media.

Further information

For animal health and welfare

www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-animal-health-and-preventing-disease-including-in-trade/supporting-pages/controlling-animal-disease

For health issues relating to zoonotic diseases

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-england
www.publichealth.hscni.net

For food safety advice

www.food.gov.uk

Major accidents

Major industrial accidents

Risk

3.88 Much has been done in the UK both to help prevent industrial accidents and to minimise their effects, but they can still occur. Industrial accidents can take a wide variety of forms and consequently their impacts can vary considerably both in scale and nature. In most cases they will have no or very limited impact outside the industrial plant and can be dealt with locally. But, as the examples from around the world detailed below show, in rare cases it is possible for there to be more significant consequences.

Background

Fires

- 3.89 Fire can be a risk either in its own right or because of the damage that it can cause. For example:
- On 14 November 1990, a fire in a telephone exchange led to the failure of all lines in the Scarborough area, including those of the coastguard, other emergency responders and the public utilities. Some cash dispensers and computer systems linked to the telephone network also failed.
 - In December 2005, the largest peacetime fire in Europe occurred at the Buncefield Oil Storage Terminal in Hemel Hempstead. There were no deaths but a number of injuries. In the short term, the surrounding

area was evacuated. Some businesses in the immediate vicinity as well as the site itself experienced much longer-term disruption to operations.

Contamination

- 3.90 Contamination can take many forms. While there are extensive arrangements in place to prevent and detect any contamination before it reaches the general public, accidents can still occur. Some of the more extreme examples, drawn from around the world, are detailed below:
- In February 2005, over 650 products were taken off the shelves in UK supermarkets due to concerns about the contamination of food products with Sudan 1 (a colouring agent used in the food industry).
 - In 1997 in Scotland and 2006 in England, water supply areas were accidentally contaminated with diesel. The event in February 2006 affected 2,500 properties in the Exeter area. The water company enacted emergency procedures and distributed alternative supplies of drinking water while the incident was investigated and resolved. The Drinking Water Inspectorate¹⁴ conducted an assessment and made recommendations and suggestions for measures to mitigate against a repeat of such incidents.
 - In 1976, an accident occurred at a chemical plant manufacturing pesticides and herbicides in Seveso, Italy. This led to the release of poisonous and carcinogenic dioxins into the air. The contamination

¹⁴ <http://dwi.defra.gov.uk/>

affected 25km² of land and vegetation. More than 600 people had to be evacuated from their homes and as many as 2,000 were treated for dioxin poisoning.

- In September 1987, a lead canister containing caesium-137 (a radioactive isotope) ruptured in Goiânia, central Brazil. The contamination was spread by human contact, wind and rainwater run-off and resulted in four deaths from exposure and contamination of 244 people, seven major properties and 42 residences.

3.91 In some cases an accident may have serious impacts on local wildlife and the surrounding environment. For example:

- In 1996, the crude oil tanker *Sea Empress* grounded off south-west Wales, spilling approximately 72,000 tonnes of oil into the sea. In 2007, the MSC *Napoli* was beached in Lyme Bay after suffering serious structural failure. A small amount of oil leaked into the sea, and some cargo washed ashore on nearby beaches. In March 2008, the *Ice Prince* sank off the Devon coast, shedding around 2,000 tonnes of timber, much of which subsequently washed up on beaches along the south coast.

Technical failure

3.92 Probably the most extreme scenario, but one of the least likely, in this section, is the nationwide loss of electricity. The high voltage electricity transmission network in the UK has never experienced a complete shutdown in its history. Nevertheless, because of our reliance on electricity for so

many aspects of our lives, even localised losses of electricity can have a significant impact on those affected. A loss of gas supply could also be significant for those who rely on gas for heating and cooking. For example:

- On 27 October 2002, a storm swept across England and Wales which resulted in interrupted electricity supplies to 2 million customers. Most were reconnected within two days, but a very small percentage of customers were disconnected for up to 10 days.
- A major accident at a gas-processing facility on 25 September 1998 severely disrupted gas supplies to the state of Victoria in Australia. Householders lost their gas for heating, cooking and hot water, as did hotels and restaurants. Industries that used gas had to close and their suppliers lost business due to the decreased demand. Gas supplies were restored to major users on 5 October and to householders in the following days.

3.93 Other examples of technical failure include:

- In April 2007, a major pumping component at a waste water treatment plant serving 800,000 customers in Edinburgh failed, causing 1,000 litres a second of partially diluted untreated sewage to be pumped into the Firth of Forth.
- The Malpasset dam on the Reyran River in southern France was breached on 2 December 1959. The breach created a wall of flood water 40m high, moving at 70km/h. It destroyed two small villages and, in 20 minutes, reached Fréjus, 7km

to the south, where it was still 3m high. The resulting flood killed over 400 people and caused widespread damage.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.94 The Government, the devolved administrations, industry, regulators and emergency responders work closely to reduce the chance of any incident occurring.

3.95 Following the Seveso incident noted above, there were major changes to European law, which is now regularly reviewed. The current legislation is the Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations 1999 (COMAH) and Control of Major Accident Hazard Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2000 under which major hazard sites are regulated and inspected in accordance with the regulations. The main aim is to prevent and mitigate the effects of major accidents involving dangerous substances.¹⁵

3.96 Following the accident at the nuclear power plant at Chernobyl in 1986, the Government prepared a National Response Plan for dealing with the effects of overseas nuclear accidents on the UK population and infrastructure¹⁶ and set up the Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET). RIMNET comprises 96 monitoring stations around the UK which hourly measure radioactivity dose levels. It is designed to deliver the coordination

of consequence management and the authoritative central science response to any overseas incident.

3.97 The UK Government has also worked to reduce the opportunity for any accident involving radioactive sources to occur, such as happened in the Goiânia incident. The High-activity Sealed Radioactive Sources and Orphan Sources (HASS) Regulations 2005 mean that sources are constantly tracked, and 6,000 surplus sources have been removed from circulation in the UK.

3.98 In the event that an industrial accident involving hazardous materials does take place, emergency responders have a well-developed capability for dealing with it. They receive specialist training and are provided with protective equipment and the relevant supplies to enable them to operate in hazardous environments and to rescue and treat casualties. Both the Ambulance and the Fire and Rescue Services have ways to decontaminate people affected by such an incident and local authorities have plans in place to open reception centres for those caught up in an incident or displaced from their homes. Where necessary, decontamination of the area of any incident can be undertaken by contractors drawn from a framework established by the Government Decontamination Service¹⁷ so that it can be returned to normal use.

3.99 Any incident involving hazardous materials, whether accidental or deliberate, requires a well-coordinated multi-agency

¹⁵www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/128795/uk_response_plan_and_rimnet_3.pdf

¹⁶www.fera.defra.gov.uk/environment/governmentDecontaminationService/index.cfm

¹⁷www.fera.defra.gov.uk/environment/governmentDecontaminationService/index.cfm

response. Accordingly, there is planning for such events at national and local level and regular testing of the plans through exercises.

Sector-specific planning

Electricity

3.100 There are comprehensive plans in place for handling both a complete national outage as well as outages in a number of local areas. In the event of a national outage (which has never occurred), and provided there has been no damage to the system, the objective would be to restore supplies throughout the UK within three to five days.

Water and sewerage

3.101 The Security and Emergency Measures (Water and Sewerage Undertakers) Direction of 1998 places a series of statutory requirements on water companies in England and Wales (the Security and Emergencies Measures Direction 2002 applies in Scotland) in relation to their emergency planning functions. All water companies have plans in place to provide alternative water supplies as well as trained and experienced personnel and suitably equipped permanent or mobile accommodation to act as command and control centres.

3.102 Where the piped mains water cannot be used, supplies of drinking water that meet the prescribed standard are required. These may be provided from other parts of the company's network not affected

by the emergency, or from neighbouring companies. They may be supplied to customers in bowsers or bottles.

Gas

3.103 All network gas companies have plans and arrangements in place to respond to a disruption in gas supplies. Beyond this, comprehensive plans are in place, underpinned by safety regulations, to do everything practicable to maintain gas supplies to domestic customers in the event of a significant disruption.

Telecommunications

3.104 Telecommunications are a vital utility underpinning economic and social endeavour. In recognition of the importance of information and communications technologies, the Government published a new Cyber Security Strategy in November 2011.

3.105 Telecommunications are highly commoditised and largely reliable. However, this means that a significant service disruption can result in disproportionate consequences. While core telecommunications networks are resilient to disruption, access networks that connect consumers to core networks are more fragile. Organisations and individuals with critical communications requirements are encouraged to review the resilience of their arrangements and take appropriate enhancing measures – the Cabinet Office provides guidance at: www.gov.uk/telecoms-resilience.

3.106 From time to time, significant disruptions to services occur. As a consequence of the highly networked nature of telecommunications infrastructures, problems experienced on one network can affect other operators. The Electronic Communications, Resilience and Response Group is an industry-run group of telecommunications companies hosted by the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills which acts to raise awareness of telecommunications resilience and facilitates a response to major incidents through the NEAT (National Emergency Alert for Telecommunications) protocol.

3.107 Over time, national telecommunications resilience is set to increase as Ofcom gains a more complete understanding of the health of networks through operators reporting system outages under the requirements of section 105 (amended May 2011) of the Communications Act 2003 and the requirements of the Digital Economy Act 2010.

Fuel

3.108 The Government's National Emergency Plan for Fuel is designed to prioritise fuel resources in the event of major disruption to supply. It includes the possibility of rationing supply to retail customers, and prioritising emergency responders and essential service providers. If there is sufficient diesel to supply emergency responders and essential service providers, then the surplus will be prioritised to truck stops and HGV motorway filling stations to help keep supply chains operational.

Marine pollution

3.109 The Maritime and Coastguard Agency has well-practised plans that include all the relevant emergency responders for both major and minor pollution incidents and procedures for handling vessels that are involved in accidents.

Planning for dam inundation

3.110 The Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales enforce the Reservoirs Act 1975 which applies to more than 2,000 reservoirs in England and Wales. They are responsible for maintaining a register of these reservoirs and achieving compliance with the Act. In Scotland, local authorities enforce the Reservoirs Act which applies to over 650 reservoirs.

3.111 Subsequent to the severe flooding of recent years and Sir Michael Pitt's review of the 2007 floods, the Environment Agency mapped the extent of the 'worst credible case' potential flood zone for each of the 2,000 or so English and Welsh reservoirs regulated under the Act. The maps are now available to emergency planners, reservoir owners and managers, and local responders and others to enable them to put plans in place to deal with any potential reservoir failure.

3.112 Since the summer of 2010 it has been possible to view whether an address in England and Wales is in an indicated flood zone for a reservoir by searching a flood map on the Environment Agency's 'What's in your Backyard' website.

Further information

Government Decontamination Service

www.gds.gov.uk

Maritime and Coastguard Agency's National Contingency Plan for Maritime Pollution

www.dft.gov.uk/mca

Radioactive Incident Monitoring Network (RIMNET)

[www.gov.uk/government/organisations/
department-of-energy-climate-change/series/
radioactive-incident-monitoring](http://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-of-energy-climate-change/series/radioactive-incident-monitoring)

Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH)

www.hse.gov.uk/comah/

Major transport accidents

Risk

3.113 Transport accidents occur across the UK on a daily basis, mainly on roads involving private vehicles, and well-practised plans are in place to deal with these at the local level. This section focuses on those rare major transport accidents which have such a significant impact that they require some form of national response. Thanks to modern safety regimes, large-scale transport accidents are very rare; nevertheless, they cannot be entirely ruled out as the following examples demonstrate.

Background

Air

3.114 There have not been any major air accidents in the UK since the Kegworth incident in 1989, when a Boeing 737 crashed close to the M1 motorway, resulting in the death of 47 passengers, with no loss of life on the ground. A more recent incident was the loss of power to a Boeing 777 on approach to Heathrow in January 2008; this emergency landing caused one serious injury and no deaths.

Maritime

- 3.115 The last major accident involving a UK-flagged ship was the sinking of the *Herald of Free Enterprise* in March 1987. The ferry capsized shortly after leaving Zeebrugge en route to Dover, resulting in over 185 deaths. The sinking of the *Estonia* in the Baltic Sea in 1994, which led to more than 850 deaths, also demonstrates the potential for loss of life on a massive scale when flooding of a vessel occurs.
- 3.116 In December 2002, the *Tricolore* was hit by a container ship in French waters in the English Channel and sank. The hazard that this created in the Channel resulted in some disruption to shipping.

Road and rail

- 3.117 While accidents do occur much more frequently on the UK's road networks than on other forms of transport, the scale of even the largest such incident would not be sufficient to warrant a coordinated central government response. Similarly, continuing improvements to rail safety regimes and infrastructure over recent years have led to a substantial reduction in both the frequency and impact of rail accidents. As with road accidents, it is highly unlikely that an incident of this kind would require a coordinated central government response.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

- 3.118 Individual transport sectors are, mostly, subject to regulation of their provision of services. All transport sector operators have plans that cover a range of possible incidents, including those most likely to create a wider impact. These plans include the diversion of resources where possible (based on safety and operational requirements).
- 3.119 The response by the emergency responders to such events is covered by their existing arrangements for responding to other types of major incidents.

Further information

Department for Transport

www.dft.gov.uk

Civil Aviation Authority

www.caa.co.uk

Transport Scotland

www.transportscotland.gov.uk

Traffic Wales

www.traffic.wales.com

Traveline Scotland

www.travelinescotland.com

Traffic Scotland

www.trafficscotland.org

Northern Ireland Public Transport

www.translink.co.uk

www.drdni.gov.uk/index/public_transport.htm

Disruptive industrial action

Risk

3.120 Industrial action typically occurs when members of a trade union are involved in a dispute with their employer that cannot be resolved by negotiation. Workers will usually take industrial action by either refusing to work altogether (strike) or refusing to work in the way their employment contract says. The UK has recently experienced a number of industrial disputes.

3.121 The Government and the devolved administrations work to monitor the frequency and potential impact of industrial action disputes, only acting as a mediator in exceptional circumstances. The Government assesses that the industrial relations climate is likely to remain unpredictable over coming months given the budget deficit, the requirement for organisations to deliver significant savings and employees' concerns over their pay, conditions, job security and pensions.

Background

Industrial action

3.122 In recent years, there have been a number of industrial action disputes which have caused disruption across the UK. The majority of this industrial action and activity at picket lines has been peaceful.

3.123 For example, in 2002–03 members of the Fire Brigades Union held a number of strikes over pay. Over this period, the armed forces were drafted in to provide essential fire fighting and rescue capability.

3.124 More recently, on 30 November 2011, coordinated strike action across several public sector unions took place.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.125 Industrial action has the potential to cause disruption to services essential to the public. Individual industrial/infrastructural sectors (for example, utility companies) have plans in place to maintain business continuity in the event of disruption by industrial action. For example, each Fire and Rescue Service has well-prepared contingency plans.

3.126 Industrial action, and any concurrent protests, also have the potential to pose significant public order challenges and place considerable demand on police resources. The Government, the police and the devolved administrations work together closely to monitor the threat of strike action, to manage the situation, and to mitigate the effects of strike action on the wider UK infrastructure where possible.

Public disorder

Risk

3.127 Public disorder can manifest itself in many ways, all of which challenge law enforcers, and can include rioting, looting, vandalism, violence and arson. It often occurs following a trigger event which causes an eruption of violence. This unrest may then provoke further disorder, often unrelated to the initial trigger. In some cases sporadic copycat activity may be facilitated by the use of social networking.

3.128 A key characteristic of this type of civil unrest is its unpredictable nature. A vast array of incidents may occur on a daily basis, all of which have the potential to elicit civil unrest. However, only a tiny minority of these events will lead to public disorder. There are several factors which may affect the likelihood of public unrest erupting: for example, it may be more likely in communities where underlying issues and friction are already present. Other social, economic and environmental factors may be behind unrest, but it can fall to one single incident to push these grievances towards violent clashes.

Background

3.129 In recent times there have been instances of serious public unrest. For example:

- On 6 August 2011 a public protest in Tottenham quickly escalated into widespread violent disorder. Over four days, violence unrelated to the initial trigger spread first in London and then to

Manchester, Salford, the West Midlands and a number of other towns and cities across England. The disorder varied in character from area to area but included violence directed at police officers, damage to property and extensive looting.

- In April 2011, police in Bristol entered a local squat to conduct an arrest. Tensions in the area were already heightened owing to the recent opening of a supermarket which had caused controversy among local groups and residents. Following the arrest, a public order incident rapidly developed with approximately 200 people clashing with police over the following hours.
- Other recent examples of serious disorder occurred in London: the G20 protests in 2009 and the 2010 protest against the rise in university tuition fees. Historically, serious disorder on this scale has been relatively infrequent in the UK: the Poll Tax riots of the 1990s and the unrest in Toxeth in 1981 are two other examples.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.130 Widespread civil unrest on the scale of that experienced in August 2011 has been rare in the UK. However, when it does occur, the speed of events and the broad range of possible triggers which cause public unrest make these incidents very difficult to predict.

3.131 In the UK, civil protection arrangements are designed to be flexible and scalable, able to adapt to any circumstances. For example, when a public order incident has the potential to place pressure on one police force, the newly enhanced National Police Coordination Centre (NPoCC) will support forces by ensuring that they receive the assistance needed to respond effectively. NPoCC also works to ensure policing resilience during major events and in an emergency that requires a national police response.

3.132 The UK is always looking to improve its ability to respond to public disorder. To this end, following the August 2011 disorders, the Home Secretary asked HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary to review how forces could increase preparedness and promote a more effective use of intelligence, tactics and resources. The police have made progress in implementing the Chief Inspector's recommendations and are now better prepared, equipped and trained to deal with disorder; a position that they will continue to build on.

Malicious attacks

3.133 As the 2010 National Security Strategy, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty*, outlined, the UK faces a serious and sustained threat from terrorism both international and from Northern Ireland. At the time of publication, the national threat assessment stands at 'substantial' having reduced from 'severe' in July 2011. The threat from Northern Ireland Related Terrorism (NIRT) in Great Britain was reduced from 'substantial' to 'moderate' in October 2012. However, the threat from NIRT in Northern Ireland is currently assessed as 'severe'.

3.134 The Intelligence and Security Committee's Annual Report to Parliament has shown that the past year has seen significant changes in the threat from international terrorism. Al Qaeda's leadership is now weaker than at any time since the 9/11 attacks. But Al Qaeda continues to pose a threat and groups affiliated to Al Qaeda in countries such as Yemen and Somalia have emerged as a threat in their own right. Many of those networks and individuals who have been judged to pose a terrorist threat continue to share an ambition to cause large numbers of casualties without warning. Some have aspirations to use non-conventional weapons such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear substances. Others aspire to attack the national infrastructure using both traditional methods and more novel methods such as cyber attack.

3.135 The Government's updated counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST (2011), is an integrated approach based on four main workstreams, each with a clear objective to reduce the risk to the UK from international terrorism. In addition, the terrible events in Woolwich showed us that individuals acting seemingly without support from overseas are a real threat. The National Risk Register is focused on preparing for emergencies and mitigating the impact of terrorist attacks (the Prepare workstream of CONTEST), but has links with all of the CONTEST workstreams outlined below:

- **Pursue:** stopping terrorist attacks
- **Prevent:** stopping people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism
- **Protect:** strengthening our protection against a terrorist attack
- **Prepare:** where an attack cannot be stopped, mitigating its impact.

3.136 Under CONTEST, comprehensive plans have been developed to protect sites critical to the national infrastructure, crowded places such as sports venues and shopping centres, and the UK's borders. Thousands of emergency responders, workers and key officials have been trained and equipped to deal with a terrorist incident, including those involving chemical, biological and radiological weapons. This ensures that our response to an attack is as effective, coordinated and speedy as possible, so that the primary aim of saving life can be achieved as well as the effective management of the impact of such an attack, leading to a quicker return to normality.

3.137 As the 2010 National Security Strategy made clear, terrorism is not the only malicious threat we face. Organised crime has a significant impact on the daily lives of UK citizens; the Home Office estimates that some £20 billion a year of social and economic harms to the UK are attributable to serious organised crime. Crime types are evolving and criminals continue to take advantage of new crime markets, technology and emerging opportunities across the world.

3.138 From October 2013, the National Crime Agency (NCA) will be a highly visible agency of operational crime fighters – transforming our response and protecting the public from the damage inflicted by serious, organised and complex crime in this country. As well as tackling organised crime, the NCA will strengthen border defences, accelerate efforts against economic crime, build on the work of the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre and consolidate expertise on cyber crime to form the first National Cyber Crime Unit.

3.139 The National Security Strategy confirms that, while we cannot rule out the re-emergence of a major state-led threat, for the foreseeable future, no state will have both the intent and capability to threaten the independence, integrity and self-government of the UK mainland. Instead, states may seek to threaten the UK's stability and freedom to act using levers such as cyber attack, espionage or significant economic or trade pressure.

Further information

Security Service (MI5)

www.mi5.gov.uk

Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)

www.soca.gov.uk

SOCA – UK Threat Assessment

www.soca.gov.uk/assessPublications/UKTA0809.html

National Crime Agency

www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-and-preventing-crime-2/supporting-pages/national-crime-agency-nc

National Security Strategy

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/reports/national-security.aspx

their nature are easily accessible and offer the prospect for an impact beyond the loss of life alone. Attacks are often carried out without warning.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.142 A substantial amount of work has been undertaken over recent years by the national network of counter-terrorism security advisers and others to reduce the vulnerability of crowded places at higher risk of terrorist attack. This has included awareness-raising initiatives and training on protective security as well as the installation of physical security measures where appropriate.

3.143 Guidance documents are available to help designers, architects, planners and others involved in the development of crowded places to incorporate proportionate protective security measures into new and pre-existing developments.

3.144 Long-standing and regularly activated major incident plans and structures are in place across government. The adaptability and expertise of the emergency responders provide a solid basis for handling a mass casualty incident. An effective response will also be one where the emergency services and other responders are able to work together. The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme aims to further improve the joint emergency response to any major or complex incident through the development of guidance and joint training and exercising. Our ability to deal

Attacks on crowded places

Risk

3.140 While there have been attacks against well-protected targets around the world, crowded places remain an attractive target for a terrorist attack.

Background

3.141 Although the UK has faced a variety of terrorist threats in the past, Al Qaeda and related terrorist groups have shown a level of ambition and willingness to carry out indiscriminate terrorist attacks. Beach bars in Bali, hotels and restaurants in Egypt, rush hour trains in Madrid and armed assaults in Mumbai have offered terrorists the prospect of high impact attacks with large numbers of casualties. Crowded places by

with mass casualties has improved steadily, with more health responders having plans to provide additional capability and capacity. The Ambulance Service's programme of introducing Hazardous Area Response Teams (applies to Ambulance Trusts in England only) is now complete. This provides training, equipment and vehicles for ambulance staff to enable them to work in hazardous areas. There is now a high level of engagement by local responders in major incident planning for fatalities and improved provision of capability at national level, under the Home Office-led mass fatalities programme.

3.145 While attacks involving firearms are infrequent, it is important to be aware that such incidents could occur. Although generic response capabilities offer a sound basis for work to respond to a terrorist incident, attacks of the kind that took place in Mumbai in November 2008 require a more specialised response. In the past two years, considerable resources have been devoted to developing more effective responses to a marauding firearms attack. While the programme of work continues, significant improvements have been made to police firearms resources and tactics, and we continue to improve joint working between the emergency services so that they can respond more effectively to this type of incident.

Further information

Scottish fire and rescue services

www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Justice/public_safety/Fire_Rescue

National Counter Terrorism Security Office

www.nactso.gov.uk/crowded_places

Home Office

www.homeoffice.gov.uk

Attacks on infrastructure

Risk

3.146 The national infrastructure comprises those facilities, systems, sites and networks necessary for the functioning of the country and the delivery of the essential services upon which daily life in the UK depends. These fundamental services, such as electricity and water supply, underpin daily life and ensure that the country continues to function socially and economically.

3.147 Many of the impacts which could result from industrial accidents, technical failure or severe weather could also result from a terrorist attack on infrastructure. The risk and impact vary according to the importance of the specific infrastructure asset attacked.

3.148 Cyber attacks on infrastructure and attacks on transport systems are dealt with in subsequent sections.

Background

3.149 Terrorists in the UK have previously attacked, or planned to attack, national infrastructure. Attempts were made to attack electricity substations in the 1990s. Bishopsgate, in the City of London, was attacked in 1993 and South Quay in London's Docklands in 1996. These attacks resulted in widespread damage and disruption but relatively few casualties. Elsewhere in the world, terrorists have carried out attacks against energy infrastructure (in Algeria and Yemen in 2007, 2008 and 2013) and against financial institutions and government buildings (such as the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001).

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.150 As with attacks on crowded places, long-standing and regularly activated major incident plans and structures are in place across government. Planning for the impacts of attacks on infrastructure is in many cases the same as for accidents or technical failure. The previous section on major industrial accidents outlines a range of these plans which, in addition to businesses' continuity plans for losses of essential services, should help anticipate and minimise the effects of any disruptions.

3.151 A comprehensive and well-established programme of work to protect the national infrastructure from terrorism and other national security threats is also in place, along with robust mechanisms to ensure an effective response by the range of government departments involved. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is the government authority that provides protective security advice to businesses and organisations across the national infrastructure. CPNI provides integrated advice on physical, information (including digital) and personnel security, aimed at minimising risk and reducing the vulnerability of the national infrastructure to terrorism, espionage and other national security threats.

Further information

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

www.cpni.gov.uk

Attacks on transport systems

Risk

3.152 Of the different malicious attacks outlined in this document, conventional attacks on transport systems are judged to be some of the more likely to occur, although the likelihood of them affecting any one individual is still extremely low. This assessment is supported by the many examples of this type of attack perpetrated by different groups across the globe. As the recent incidents outlined below indicate, attacks on transport systems can take different forms with different levels of impact.

Background

Rail and underground

3.153 Stringent security measures are applied at airports. Rail and underground networks, however, are open systems, which makes them attractive potential targets and there have been several successful attacks on rail networks worldwide.

3.154 On 7 July 2005, London's transport system was attacked with four explosions (three on underground trains, one on a bus). This was followed by unsuccessful attacks two weeks later. There have also been a number of examples in other countries of successful attacks against underground systems (Moscow, 2004) and mainline rail services (Madrid, 2004).

Air

3.155 Over the past 20 years there have been a number of attacks by terrorists against the aviation industry. These include the 1988 Pan Am flight blown up over Lockerbie, the deliberate use of hijacked planes to attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001, and the attempted attack using explosives concealed in shoes on a transatlantic flight in 2001. Despite this ongoing threat, the number of attacks has remained relatively small, due in part to the work of the police, security and transport safety authorities and to the development of appropriate security measures at airports. The 2006 liquid bomb plot, which targeted multiple transatlantic airliners, demonstrated both the profile of commercial aviation as a terrorist target, and the capacity of some terrorists to devise innovative methods to circumvent security.

3.156 A more recent example of this took place on 25 December 2009 when an attempt was made to detonate a device by a Nigerian citizen on a Northwestern Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit. The device used had clearly been constructed to make detection by existing screening methods extremely difficult. While there are a number of security screening methods in place, no technology can be 100% effective, but it is clear that security scanners can help to detect devices. It therefore makes sense that they be deployed as swiftly as possible to add to the capabilities we already have for detecting possible threat items. Accordingly, security scanners have

been introduced at three of the UK's largest airports, and a further roll-out of technology has been announced.¹⁸

3.157 In October 2010, a plot to detonate explosive devices concealed in printer cartridges on cargo planes en route to the USA was disrupted. Following the incident, the UK reviewed and enhanced its cargo security processes, and worked with international partners to strengthen security measures and explosive detection capabilities at air cargo departure points around the world. An EU high-risk cargo regime which sets security screening standards for all in-bound cargo from the rest of the world has also been established.

Maritime

3.158 To date, no attack against maritime interests in the UK has been mounted by terrorists. The introduction of the International Shipping and Ports Facility Security Code has served to improve maritime security in the UK and this is likely to have a deterrent effect, although maritime attacks like those seen overseas (for example, the suicide bomb attack on the USS *Cole* when it was harboured in Aden in 2000 and the attack on the oil tanker *M. Star* 2010) cannot be ruled out in the UK in the future.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.159 Individual public transport sectors are, mostly, subject to regulation of their provision of services. All transport sector operators have contingency plans that cover a range of possible scenarios including malicious attacks that are most likely to create a wide impact. Those plans include the diversion of resources where possible (based on safety and operational requirements) to ensure that some form of public transportation is available.

Rail and underground

3.160 These remain popular targets due to the large number of people who travel on these systems each day and the ease of access to them. Security for the national rail network, as well as for London Underground, the Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow Subway, is regulated and monitored by the Department for Transport (DfT). As open networks, these systems will always be more vulnerable to attack than closed systems such as aviation. Both Network Rail and London Underground have robust plans in place to respond to emergencies and these are regularly tested and updated. The British Transport Police are responsible for policing British rail networks and are closely involved in contingency planning, as well as working with industry and DfT on security issues.

¹⁸ www.dft.gov.uk/news/statements/greening-20111121

3.161 Eurostar services through the Channel Tunnel are subject to a more stringent security regime, similar to that which exists at airports, under which all passengers and their baggage are currently subject to screening.

Air

3.162 Stringent protective security measures exist at UK and EU member states' airports. Airlines and airports are required to carry out a range of specified measures to mitigate the risk of attack. These include the following:

- screening of passengers and their bags, as well as of all staff working in restricted areas
- physical security measures including the separation of incoming international passengers from all outbound travellers
- background checks on staff in sensitive posts.

3.163 Security measures are also in place to protect aircraft in flight, such as the compulsory locking of cockpit doors. These security regimes are regularly inspected by DfT to ensure compliance. In addition, DfT provides advice to UK airlines operating overseas on measures needed at their foreign stations.

Maritime

3.164 Stringent protective security measures exist (including tightly controlled access) for cruise ships and ferries serving the UK. New rules for domestic ferries came into effect on 1 July 2007 as domestic sea-going ferries now fall within the scope of the EU regulation for enhancing ship and port facility security.

Further information

Department for Transport

www.dft.gov.uk

Unconventional attacks

Risk and background

3.165 The events of 9/11 showed that mass impact terrorist events, while unlikely, cannot be ruled out. The likelihood of terrorists successfully undertaking an attack against a nuclear or chemical facility or obtaining chemical, biological radiological or nuclear (CBRN) material remains low but not negligible. The Government is prioritising efforts to stop terrorists gaining the expertise and the material to deliver such attacks. But if terrorist attacks were successful, their potential impact on the UK would be severe and significantly greater than a conventional attack.

Smaller-scale CBR attacks

3.166 To date there have been relatively few examples of attacks perpetrated using chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) materials. The most significant include the chemical attack on the Tokyo underground system in 1995 perpetrated by Aum Shinrikyo and the sending of letters containing anthrax to government buildings in the USA in 2001.

3.167 The potential nature of the impact of an attack using CBR materials will depend on a range of factors, including the type and quantity of the CBR material used. CBR materials could be used on a small-scale (assassination or poisoning) or as mass-impact weapons (widespread dispersion and contamination). Such attacks could take the form of release of harmful materials in an indoor or outdoor environment or contamination of food or water. Radiological materials could also be combined with explosives to produce a radiological dispersal device (a so-called 'dirty bomb') that would aim to spread radioactive material over a wide area.

Catastrophic terrorist attacks

3.168 Terrorists will often seek to undertake attacks which target our vulnerabilities and cause disproportionate impacts. While the likelihood of terrorists carrying out 9/11 'copycat'-style attacks or obtaining effective mass-impact biological agents or an improvised nuclear device remains low, it is not negligible. Attacks of this type may be significantly more challenging than

conventional attacks because of the nature of the potential health impacts resulting from the materials used and because they may result in widespread environmental contamination. Specialist responses may be needed and, in some cases, the clean-up process may be protracted as well as unfamiliar and untested.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

Smaller-scale CBR attacks

3.169 Effective, coordinated and speedy responses to an attack can save lives, and it is vital to manage the immediate impact of a CBR attack effectively. The UK has concentrated much of its resource and funding on improving the level of preparedness so that the emergency responders can act quickly and safely in what could be life-threatening situations.

3.170 There is a well-developed specialist capability among the emergency responders and other responder agencies for dealing with small-scale CBR incidents, with planning and regular testing of plans at all levels to ensure an effective and integrated response. Emergency responders receive specialist training and are provided with protective equipment to enable them to operate in hazardous environments and to rescue and treat any casualties. Both the Ambulance and the Fire and Rescue Services have means to decontaminate people affected by such an incident and local authorities have plans in place to

open reception centres for those caught up in an incident or displaced from their homes. We are spreading expertise more widely so that non-specialists are better able to undertake life-saving activities prior to the arrival of specialist resources.

Catastrophic terrorist attacks

3.171 The UK Resilience Capabilities Programme, led by the Cabinet Office, is the core framework through which the Government seeks to build resilience across the UK to meet the generic consequences of a wide range of civil emergencies, including catastrophic impact attacks, such as 9/11-style attacks. In addition, the Government continues to build capabilities to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack involving a biological agent or improvised nuclear device. In particular, the focus is on those measures that would have the greatest impact on reducing deaths and illness.

3.172 This will include building up stocks of medical counter-measures and agreeing emergency arrangements for their distribution; flexing the capacity of the NHS to provide supportive care in an incident; improving our ability to detect and monitor biological and radiological hazards; updating our operational response; building evacuation and shelter plans to allow for the scale of these kinds of disaster; and making improvements to the communications plans to ensure that the public know what they can do to minimise the risk to them.

Further information

Government Decontamination Service

www.fera.defra.gov.uk/environment/governmentDecontaminationService/index.cfm

Home Office

www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-the-uk-against-terrorism

Cabinet Office

www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/ukresilience

Cyber security

Risk

3.173 Cyber space has become central to our economy and our society. Increasing our reliance on cyber space brings new opportunities but also new threats. While cyber space fosters open markets and open societies, this very openness can also make us more vulnerable to those – criminals, hackers, foreign intelligence services – who want to harm us by compromising or damaging our critical data and systems.

3.174 The impacts of cyber attacks are felt in our economy, in our critical national infrastructure and in society.

3.175 The digital architecture on which we now rely was built to be efficient and interoperable. When the internet first started to grow, security was less of a consideration. However, as we put more of our lives online, this matters more and more.

3.176 Unfortunately, a growing number of adversaries are looking to use cyber space to steal, compromise or destroy critical data. The scale of our dependence means that our prosperity, our key infrastructure, our places of work and our homes can all be affected.

Background

3.177 Criminals are exploiting the internet to target the UK in a variety of ways. Identity theft and fraud online now dwarf their offline equivalents. Cyber space allows criminals to target the UK from other jurisdictions across the world, making it harder to enforce the law.

3.178 Some of the most sophisticated threats to the UK in cyber space come from other states which seek to spy on or compromise our military, industrial and economic assets.

3.179 Cyber space is already used by terrorists to spread propaganda, radicalise potential supporters, raise funds, communicate and plan. While terrorists can be expected to continue to favour high-profile physical attacks, the possibility that they might also use cyber space to facilitate or to mount attacks against the UK is growing.

3.180 The threat to the UK from politically motivated activist groups operating in cyber space is real. Attacks orchestrated by hacktivists on public and private sector websites and online services are becoming more common and aim to cause disruption and reputational and financial damage and to gain publicity.

Planning by the Government, the devolved administrations and the emergency responders

3.181 The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, *Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty*, announced a £650 million, four-year National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) intended to transform the Government's response to cyber threats. The NCSP is managed and coordinated on behalf of the Government by the Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance in the Cabinet Office, under the oversight of the Minister for the Cabinet Office.

3.182 The intelligence agencies and Ministry of Defence have a strong role in improving our understanding of – and reducing – the vulnerabilities and threats that the UK faces in cyber space. Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) in particular is central to this effort. But the Home Office, Cabinet Office and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills are also receiving funding to bolster their specific individual capabilities, recognising that outreach to business and the public is crucial.

3.183 With the rise of cyber crime, what was a concern primarily for the defence and intelligence elements of government is now something that concerns us all. The new National Crime Agency will consolidate expertise on cyber crime to form the first National Cyber Crime Unit. This will draw together and enhance work currently carried out by the e-crime unit in the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Police Central e-Crime Unit,

working at a national and international level, and in partnership with industry and intelligence agencies, to tackle the most serious cyber criminals, and to drive up capability to tackle cyber crime at all levels of law enforcement.

3.184 Of course, much of the UK's critical infrastructure is not in government hands but is owned and managed by the private sector. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure is already working with a network of critical national infrastructure companies and in partnership with the devolved administrations to ensure that they take the necessary steps to protect key systems and data.

3.185 *The UK Cyber Security Strategy: Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world* was published in November 2011. It is designed to reduce the risks and secure the benefits of a trusted digital environment for business and individuals. Its vision is for the UK, by 2015, to derive huge economic and social value from a vibrant, resilient and secure cyber space, where our actions, guided by our core values of liberty, fairness, transparency and the rule of law, will enhance prosperity, national security and a strong society.

3.186 To achieve this vision, the National Cyber Security Strategy will deliver against four objectives: to tackle cyber crime and make the UK one of the most secure places in the world to do business in cyber space; to make the UK more resilient to cyber attacks and better able to protect our interests in cyber space; to help shape an open, stable and vibrant cyber space

which the UK public can use safely and which supports open societies; and to build the UK's cross-cutting knowledge, skills and capability to underpin all our cyber security objectives.

Further information

Office of Cyber Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA)

www.gov.uk/government/policy-teams/office-of-cyber-security-and-information-assurance

Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure

www.cpni.gov.uk

CESG (National Technical Authority for Information Assurance)

www.cesg.gov.uk

Get Safe Online

www.getsafeonline.org

General advice

All government departments will be migrating to a new website, www.GOV.UK, during 2013. The links in this document should redirect to the new pages. If not, you should be able to find the information in the relevant departmental and policy pages on the website.

UK Resilience

www.gov.uk/government/policies/improving-the-uks-ability-to-absorb-respond-to-and-recover-from-emergencies

Wales Resilience

www.walesresilience.gov.uk/?lang=en

Scottish Preparing for Emergencies and BCM Guidance

www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/03/2940

Northern Ireland Civil Contingencies

www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/index/making-government-work/civil-contingencies.htm

British Standards Institution

www.bsigroup.co.uk/bs25999

Emergency Planning College

www.epcollege.com

Specific advice across the UK

Road traffic

www.highways.gov.uk
www.trafficscotland.org
www.roadsni.gov.uk

Rail

www.nationalrail.co.uk
www.translink.co.uk

Fuel and gas

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-of-energy-climate-change
www.detini.gov.uk

Electricity

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-of-energy-climate-change

Water supply

www.gov.uk/government/policies/maintaining-secure-water-supplies-high-standards-of-drinking-water-and-effective-sewerage-services/supporting-pages/safe-drinking-water
www.environmentagency.gov.uk
www.sepa.org.uk
www.drdni.gov.uk
www.niwater.com

Food

www.food.gov.uk

Human diseases

www.dh.gov.uk

www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk

www.gov.uk/government/organisations/public-health-england

www.scot.nhs.uk

www.dhsspsni.gov.uk

www.publichealth.hscni.net

www.hscni.net

www.gov.uk/pandemic-flu

Animal diseases

www.gov.uk/government/policies/protecting-animal-health-and-preventing-disease-including-in-trade-supporting-pages-controlling-animal-disease

Telecommunications and IT

www.cpni.gov.uk

Health and safety

www.hse.gov.uk

www.hseni.gov.uk

Schools

www.education.gov.uk/schools/adminandfinance/emergencyplanning
www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Education/Schools

www.deni.gov.uk

Severe weather

www.metoffice.gov.uk

Flooding

www.environment-agency.gov.uk

www.sepa.org.uk

www.riversagency.cymru.gov.uk

Fire

www.communities.gov.uk/fire

Useful telephone numbers**Floodline (England and Wales)**

0845 988 1188

Flooding Incident Line (Northern Ireland)

0300 2000 100

**Scottish Environment Protection Agency
Floodline service**

0845 988 1188

Highways Agency – 24 hours traffic

08700 660 115

Highways Agency Information Line

08457 50 40 30

Traffic Scotland

0800 028 1414

Traffic Watch (Northern Ireland)

0845 712 3321

National Rail Enquiries

08457 48 49 50

Translink (Northern Ireland)

028 9066 6630

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Travel Advice

0870 606 0290

NHS Direct (England and Wales)

0845 46 47

NHS 24 (Scotland)

08454 24 24 24